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"Intended Use" And The Unsafe Automobile:
Manufacturers' Liability For Negligent Design
Larsen v. General Motors Corp.'
A singular phenomenon of the contemporary law of torts is the
peculiar reluctance of American courts to impose on automobile manu-
facturers a duty to design automobiles to provide reasonable safety
for passengers in the event of an accident. Under the prevailing rule,
the manufacturer's duty is limited to designing an automobile which
would be reasonably safe for its "intended use." The concept of "in-
tended use" in products liability cases has been used to limit a manu-
facturer's liability, under a negligence theory, to injuries caused by
foreseeable contingencies.2 The courts have consistently held that the
"intended use" of an automobile does not include its participation in
accidents.3 Accordingly, recovery has been awarded for injuries sus-
81. Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 235 (1948). Some federal judges would abolish diversityjurisdiction except for removal to a federal court by a non-resident defendant upon
a showing that "from prejudice or local influence he will not be able to obtain justice
in such State courts." Id. at 236 n.98.
82. But see notes 17-24 supra and accompanying text.
83. In one case, for example, the plaintiff contended unsuccessfully that the cost
of bringing suit in the state courts was "prohibitive." Brandtscheit v. Britton, 239 F.
Supp. 652, 655 (N.D. Cal. 1965).
1. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
2. "Intended use," "intended purpose" and "normal use" are all synonyms for
"foreseeability," and what is foreseeable enough to impose a duty is, in the last
analysis, determined by a variety of policy considerations. See W. PROSStR, TORTS
§ 96, at 665-69 (3d ed. 1964).
3. E.g., Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966) ; Evans v. General
Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967);
Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967). Cf. Schemel
v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945(1968) ; Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
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tained in accidents caused by negligent design,4 but not where faulty
design resulted only in the enhancement of injuries sustained in col-
lisions attributable to other causes.' In contrast, in other areas of
products liability courts have imposed on manufacturers a duty to
design their products to provide maximum safety in the event of acci-
dents arising from normal use.6 The reasons for the refusal of the
courts to similarly expand the duty of the automobile manufacturer
are not altogether clear. The primary factors are apparently a convic-
tion that automobile passengers should assume the risks attending
that mode of transportation and an accompanying fear of placing too
great a burden on the automobile industry.
Imposition of a duty on automobile manufacturers to design cars
which provide reasonable safety for their passengers in accident situa-
tions has far-reaching economic ramifications. Because the duty is
imposed at the point of initial planning, the burden of foreseeing the
consequences of such planning is particularly heavy. Further, the tech-
nological effect of a breach of the design duty is more sweeping than
a breach of the manufacturer's duty to carefully construct automobiles,
since in the former case all production procedures may have to be
modified. Because of these factors, courts have felt that if a duty with
such a far-reaching impact is to be placed on the manufacturer, it
should be done not by the courts, but rather by the legislature, act-
ing prospectively.' In addition, some courts evidently feel that juries
are not competent to deal with the complex technical considerations
involved in automobile design cases.' As a result, prior to Larsen v.
General Motors Corp.,9 no plaintiff had ever succeeded at the appellate
level by alleging that negligent design had added to, or increased the
severity of, injuries received in an automobile accident."0
In Larsen, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found the
factual situation sufficiently compelling to warrant departure from the
previous automobile design cases. The plaintiff was the driver of an
automobile involved in a head-on collision. The impact of the crash
drove the steering mechanism of the car backward and upward so that
4. E.g., Carpini v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co., 216 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1954)(negligent design of brakes of bus caused accident producing plaintiff's injury) ; Rosin
v. International Harvester Co., 262 Minn. 445, 115 N.W.2d 50 (1962) (negligent
design of differential seal of pickup truck permitted lubricant to leak onto brakes
causing accident producing plaintiff's injury). Cf. Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288
F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961) (negligent design of automobile gas tank and trunk caused
explosion which injured plaintiff - defendant was supplier of the foreign made car) ;
Elliot v. General Motors Corp., 296 F.2d 125 (7th Cir. 1961) (mechanic's arm severed
by sharp edge of automobile splash pan).
5. See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L
Rev. 645 (1967).
6. Notes 31-33, 45 infra and accompanying text.
7. See Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968) ; Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967). Cf. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95
N.E.2d 802 (1950).
8. See, e.g., Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 466, 329 P.2d 605 (1955).
9. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
10. See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIF. L.
Rzv. 645 (1967) ; Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for the
Use of a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962) ; Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 91 (1961).
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it injured the plaintiff's head. The alleged defective design did not
cause the collision, but the plaintiff contended that because of the
defective design, he received injuries he would not otherwise have
received. He claimed that the rearward displacement of the steering
shaft was much greater in his 1963 Corvair than it would have been
in other cars. The plaintiff based his claim on the theory that an
automobile manufacturer is under a duty of reasonable care in the
design of an automobile to make it safe for its intended use and that
the intended use of an automobile includes the possibility of collision
with other automobiles or with stationary objects. The district court,
consistent with existing authority, rejected the plaintiff's contentions
and granted a summary judgment for the defendant. 1 The court of
appeals reversed, charging the manufacturer with a duty to foresee the
possibility of accident and to design the automobile to provide a
reasonable amount of safety for its passengers in case of an accident.
The court also imposed a correlative duty to warn of a dangerous
condition in vehicle design. 2
THE CONCEPT OF "INTENDED USE"
Today, the generally accepted duty of an automobile manufac-
turer is to design an automobile that will be reasonably safe for its
intended purpose, without concealing defects which would make it
dangerous to persons using it for that purpose.' 8  Although courts
may vary in their language, the requirements are relatively uniform:
(1) the duty in design extends only to the "intended use" of the
product;14 (2) the manufacturer is not an insurer and has no duty
to make the product "accident-proof" or "fool-proof";1" and (3) the
manufacturer is not under a duty to make the product "more safe"
where the danger is obvious to all.' 6
11. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1967).
12. Although the plaintiff based his claim on three distinct theories, negligence,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability and strict liability, the court decided
the case on the negligence theory alone. The court expressly refused to consider the
issue of implied warranty or that of strict liability, arguing that these were policy
questions to be decided by the legislature. The court was apparently uncertain as to
whether the Michigan courts would consider an automobile to be a dangerous instru-
mentality within the doctrine of strict liability. Accordingly, the court concluded:
"The common law standard of a duty to use reasonable care in light of all the cir-
cumstances can at least serve the needs of our society until the legislature imposes
higher standards or the courts expand the doctrine of strict liability for tort." 391
F.2d at 506.
13. See, e.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) op ToRTS § 398 (1965).
Maryland has very little relevant case law on this topic. However, Maryland appears
to follow the Restatement rule for negligent design of a product. See Woolley v.
Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 211 A.2d 302 (1965) ; Babylon v. Scruton, 215 Md. 299, 138
A.2d 375 (1958). See also Banko v. Continental Motors Corp., 373 F.2d 314 (4th
Cir. 1966).
14. E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967).
15. E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967). Cf. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802,
804 (1950).
16. E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967). Cf. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802,
804 (1950).
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In the final analysis, however, the scope of the manufacturer's
design duty depends on the courts' interpretation of "intended use."
This concept has been used in the automobile cases to narrow the duty
of the manufacturer. Many courts have feared that a liberal extension
of intended use would make the manufacturer an insurer of his
product's safety.'" One of the most influential expressions of this
trend of thought was the New York Court of Appeals' opinion in
Campo v. Scofield,'" a case which did not involve automobiles. Campo,
a farm hand, had to place his hands near a set of revolving steel rollers
in order to feed onions into an onion-topping machine. Campo's hands
were caught in the steel rollers and badly injured. He claimed the
manufacturer was negligent in not designing a safety guard or stopping
device. The court held that these allegations failed to constitute a
cause of action because there was nothing to indicate that the manu-
facturer could reasonably have foreseen such a danger: "If a manu-
facturer does everything necessary to make the machine function
properly for the purpose for which it [was] designed, if the machine
is without any latent defect, and if its functioning creates no greater
danger or peril that is not known to the user, then the manufacturer
has satisfied the law's demands."'" The emphasis under the Campo
approach is on the exclusion of obvious dangers from the scope of
intended use. The natural effect of such a limitation is that the manu-
facturer must only design a product that functions properly; he is not
obliged to design a product that functions safely.
The courts were quick to apply the rule of Campo v. Scofield
to automobile design cases,2 holding that automobile accidents are
an obvious danger, and, therefore, are not part of a car's intended
use.2' The influence of Campo has produced an anachronism in legal
reasoning by eliminating the duty to design an automobile so that it
will safely meet a reasonably expected emergency. 22 In Kahn v.
Chrysler Corp.2' a boy on a bicycle collided with a parked car, and
his injuries were aggravated by a protruding tail fin; in Hatch v. Ford
Motor Co.,24 a child's injuries were enhanced by a sharp hood orna-
ment when he ran into the front of a parked car. The court in each
case held that such a risk was not to be anticipated in the normal use
of the car. Since the person injured was not a passenger in the car
and since the car was parked, the manufacturer owed no duty to the
17. See, e.g., Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
18. 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
19. 95 N.E.2d at 804.
20. The Campo decision has been extensively cited in automobile design cases to
support limitations the courts have placed on the manufacturer's duty. See, e.g.,
Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
836 (1967) ; Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
21. E.g., Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967).
22. See, e.g., Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
23. 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963).
24. 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (1958).
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injured party.25 In Muncy v. General Motors Corp.,2" the Supreme
Court of Texas held that General Motors was not under a duty to
anticipate that the design of their ignition switch, which permitted a
driver to remove the key without turning off the engine, would permit
a driverless car to run down a pedestrian on the sidewalk." Nor, in
Gossett v. Chrysler Corp.,25 was there a foreseeable emergency within
the concept of intended use when an allegedly defective hood latch
slipped, allowing the hood of a moving vehicle to fly up and obstruct
the driver's vision.2 9 In Schemel v. General Motors Corp.,30 where
a plaintiff was struck by a car traveling 115 miles per hour, it was
held that the manufacturer was not obligated to foresee the possible
misuse of the automobile and, therefore, was under no duty to provide
a "governor."
The continuing dominance of Campo v. Scofield over automobile
design cases has produced another irony. The specific holding of Campo
concerned the duty to design safety features on farm machinery. The
most recent farm machinerv cases are typified by the Iowa case of
Calkins v. Sandvin,3' in wiich the plaintiff was allowed to recover
against the manufacturer when his arm was caught in the moving
part of a "grain-o-vator." Similarly, in Wright v. Massey-Harris,
Inc., the manufacturer was held to have a duty to provide a safety
shield for the same kind of "obvious danger" found in Campo. If
negligent design of the product involved is likely to endanger life and
limb, the courts in these cases look beyond the exact purpose for
which it was designed to the foreseeable risk it creates, often requiring
safety guards even for obvious dangers."3 Thus, while the courts con-
tinue to rely on the Campo decision in limiting the automobile manu-
facturer's duty to design a safe car, the influence of that decision in
the area for which it was originally developed has become minimal.34
25. In Hatch there was an additional problem of statutory interpretation. The
court felt that a statute prohibiting the sale or operation of a motor vehicle equipped
with a protruding hood ornament was not designed to protect those who by their own
acts collided with a lawfully parked car.
26. 357 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. 1962).
27. The Muncy opinion speaks of the automobile's intended use. This raises an
interesting point as to which product is considered in determining intended use, as
the product alleged to have been negligently designed in Muncy was not the automobile
as a whole, but rather the ignition mechanism. While the circumstances that followed
were not reasonably foreseeable under the automobile's intended purpose, they certainly
were foreseeable within the intended purpose of the ignition switch.
28. 359 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1966).
29. There was, however, in Gossett a strong possibility of intervening negligence
on the part of a third party or of misuse by the plaintiff.
30. 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 945 (1968).
31. 256 Iowa 682, 129 N.W.2d 1 (1964).
32. 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
33. See Calkins v. Sandvin, 256 Iowa 682, 129 N.W.2d 1 (1964); Moberly v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 126, 211 N.E.2d 839 (1965); Wright v.
Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
34. Many of these cases bear a strong factual similarity to the situation in Campo.
Compare Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950) with Wright v.
Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966).
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THE "SECOND COLLISION" AS AN ARTIFICIAL DISTINCTION
The concept of the "second collision" has played an important
part in prior judicial definitions of the "intended use" of automobiles. 5
The "second collision" occurs when an occupant strikes some feature
of the vehicle's interior immediately after his vehicle has collided with
another object. In the past, a manufacturer could be held liable for
the injuries of the "second collision" under a negligent design theory
only if the negligent design was the cause of the "first collision."3
Although the automobile manufacturer's duty to foresee the
"second collision" as part of the car's intended use has been recognized
in automobile cases involving negligent construction, 7 prior to the
Larsen decision a similar duty had not been recognized in automobile
design cases.38 In the two years prior to Larsen, three important cases
held that automobile manufacturers had no duty to design automobiles
to minimize the effects of the second collision. 9 Typical of these
pre-Larsen cases is Evans v. General Motors Corp.,4" which held that:
"The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participa-
tion in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability
to foresee the possibility that such collisions may occur."'" In Evans,
the decedent was involved in a broadside collision. The plaintiff con-
tended that the decedent's death was caused by the total collapse of
the car's left side due to the "X"-frame employed by the manufacturer;
it was alleged that another frame design then in use would have re-
duced the possibility of such a collapse. The court was careful to
distinguish Evans from cases in which the defective design caused
the accident: "The products involved in all these cases were unfit for
their intended use and in precisely that respect were the cause of acci-
dental injuries."4 2 The Evans court argued that to make the auto-
mobile manufacturer responsible for the effects of collisions would place
him in the position of designing an "accident-proof" car.
Relying on the Evans decision, the courts have denied recovery
in other recent cases. In Shumard v. General Motors Corp.,43 where
a fire rapidly spread throughout a car after collision, the manufacturer
was placed under no duty to design a "fireproof" car. Similarly, in
35. See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALIX. L.
Rnv. 645, 655 (1967).
36. See cases cited note 4 supra.
37. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959).
38. See notes 3 & 5 supra.
39. Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,385 U.S. 836 (1967); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio
1967) ; Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
40. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1967). Many law
review articles have been critical of the Evans decision and the line of thought it
represents. See Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALI.
L. R-v. 645 (1967); Note, Manufacturer's Liability for an "Uncrashworthy" Auto-
mobile, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 444 (1967) ; Note, Liability for Negligent Automobile Design,52 IoWA L. Rev. 953 (1967); 42 NOTRE DAMs LAW. 111 (1967); 1966 UTAH L. Rxv.
698; 80 HARV. L. Rzv. 688 (1967).41. 359 F.2d at 825. In Evans, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision granting a motion to dismiss.
42. Id. (emphasis added).
43. 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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Willis v. Chrysler Corp.," the manufacturer was absolved of liability
for injuries sustained when plaintiff's car split in two following a
collision. Thus, eighteen years after Campo v. Scofield, the automobile
manufacturer still had no duty to foresee the obvious danger of
automobile collision. While the design duty of automobile manufac-
turers remained narrow, the duty of other manufacturers to carefully
design their products had been greatly expanded.4 5
Departing from the Evans rationale, the court in Larsen v.
General Motors Corp. based its definition of "intended use" on the
principles set out in the non-automobile products liability cases. The
court argued that the environment in which a product is used is as
relevant to a consideration of "intended use" as the actual function
for which it is made, citing Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc.,46 and other
similar cases. In Spruill, a fourteen month old infant accidentally
swallowed some furniture polish left on a table by his mother. The
defendants maintained that their furniture wax was not intended to
be swallowed, and that therefore they owed no duty. In the court's
opinion:
Since their product was not intended to be consumed, [the de-
fendants] say, there is no liability for death or injury resulting
from consumption of it. We agree with the general principle but
the application the defendants would have us make of it here is
44. 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967). The plaintiff's claim in Willis was based
on an alleged breach of implied warranty, but the court used the "intended use" theory
developed in the negligence cases to reject that claim.
45. See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950)
(gas storage tank) ; Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1934) (coffee
urn) ; Hyatt v. Hyster Co., 106 F. Supp. 676 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), rev'd by stipulation,
205 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1953) (fork-lift truck) ; Phillips v. Ogle Aluminum Furniture,
Inc., 106 Cal. App. 2d 650, 235 P.2d 857 (1951) (aluminum tubular chair) ; Wright v.
Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966) (cornpicker) ; Clark
v. Zuzuch Truck Lines, 344 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. 1961) (tractor); Marathon Battery
Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. 1966) (battery); South Austin Drive-In
Theater v. Thomison, 421 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. 1967) (power lawn mower). Contra
Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966), vacated and remanded,
388 U.S. 459 (1967) (packaging of doors); Murphy v. Cory Pump & Supply Co.,
47 Ill. App. 2d 382, 197 N.E.2d 849 (1964) (power lawn mower). See generally Noel,
Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALZ L.J.
816 (1962) ; Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 93 (1961).
A good contrast between the old and new views is found in Hentschel v. Baby
Bathinette Corp., 215 F.2d 102 (2d Cir. 1954). The defendant manufactured a bathi-
nette made partly of a magnesium alloy. The material was highly inflammable and
when ignited by an independently caused fire it could not be extinguished in a normal
manner, since water fed the flames rather than killing them. The plaintiffs alleged
that use of such inflammable material constituted negligent design, since it greatly
increased the fire danger to persons nearby. The majority held that the product
contained no latent defect that would endanger a bathing baby. Since it was safe for
its intended use, the manufacturer had satisfied his legal duty. Judge Frank's lengthy
dissent states the rule prevailing today in home product cases: it is not sufficient to
look strictly at the intended purpose for which a product is made. The manufacturer
has a duty to foresee the natural consequences of the product's use. Id. at 105. The
recent cases indicate that the manufacturer must take into consideration the character
of the product sold and its reasonably foreseeable dangers. See, e.g., Wright v.
Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966) ; Moberly v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 4 Ohio App. 2d 126, 211 N.E.2d 839 (1965). For critiques of
Hentschel, see Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty
to Warn, 41 VA. L. REv. 145 (1955) ; Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or
Directions For Use Of A Product, 71 YAL" L.J. 816 (1962).
46. 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962).
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much too narrow.... [The manufacturer] must also be expected
to anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of
his product. . .."
The Larsen opinion adopted parallel reasoning: "While automobiles.
are not made for the purpose of colliding with each other, a frequent
and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use will result in col-
lisions and injury-producing impacts."4 It is important to remember,
however, that the Larsen opinion did not explicitly reformulate the,
traditional rule.49 Although Larsen liberalized the concept of "intended
use," it still insisted that the automobile manufacturer should not be
required to design an "accident-proof" car or to be an insurer of the
safety of his product. The Larsen court considered the "present state
of the art" of automobile manufacturing and limited the manufac-
turer's duty to the use of only that amount of reasonable care in design
which is necessary to avoid subjecting the passenger to an "unreason-
able risk of injury."5 The manufacturer, then, under this standard,
has the duty to use current knowledge of design to minimize, not
eliminate, the injurious effects of collision. Assuming that it is not
presently feasible for the manufacturer to market a completely safe
car, there exists what the court terms a "normal hazard" to the auto-
mobile user. The manufacturer's duty is breached only when, because
of his negligence in design, the hazard becomes "unreasonable."
Since the passage of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle'
Safety Act of 1966,"' manufacturers have argued that their liability'
in regard to safe design is limited to the standards and sanctions set
forth in that Act. Presumably, the courts of Campo v. Scofield and
Evans v. General Motors Corp. would agree, since they argued that
such a fundamental change in duty should be effected by the legisla-
ture and limited to the standards it imposes. The language of the
statute itself, however, negates this contention; it expressly provides
that compliance with its standards will not exempt any person from
common law liability.52 The statute does, however, provide relevant
guidelines that may be of use to courts searching for a substantive
measure of the reasonable care in design which should be required of
the automobile manufacturer53
THE POLICY BASES FOR THE REDEFINITION
OF "INTENDED USE"
The Larsen opinion resolves many inconsistencies in the area of
products liability. In attempting to keep automobile manufacturers free
47. Id. at 83.
48. 391 F.2d at 502.
49. See notes 13-16 supra and accompanying text.
50. In the court's own words: "The sole function of an automobile is not just to
provide a means of transportation, it is to provide a means of safe transportation or
as safe as is reasonably possible under the present state of the art." 391 F.2d at 502.
51. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1381-1425 (Supp. 1967).
52. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1397(c) (Supp. 1967).
53. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1397, 1400-02 (Supp. 1967). See also Nader & Page,
Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55 CALI. L. R.v. 645, 669-73 (1967).
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from a duty to design "crash-proof" cars, courts have created a separate
law of products liability for automobiles based on outdated principles.
As late as 1936 the ancient case of Winterbottom v. Wright54 was
cited as controlling. At a time when most manufacturers were required
to foresee that their products might be used in ways they did not
intend, the automobile manufacturer was not obliged to foresee the fact
that many cars will be involved in injury-producing accidents.
Economic and technical conditions have changed markedly since
the phrase "intended use" was first used by Judge Cardozo in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Corp.55 In 1916, the automobile industry
had just emerged from its infancy. In an era of small, struggling
manufacturers 56 with limited technical capabilities, a narrow definition
of "intended use" was appropriate. However, the production of motor
vehicles soon became the country's largest industry,5 7 and the vigorous
competition among producers characterizing the industry's earlier years
gave way to oligopoly, with three manufacturers accounting for nearly
all sales of domestically produced cars. A corresponding increase
occurred in the technical capabilities of the manufacturers. Today, the
automobile manufacturers have at their disposal the technology, facilities
and trained manpower to design a reasonably "safe" automobile.
Since MacPherson, there have also been many changes in the
environment in which the automobile is used. In 1916, the few auto-
mobiles in use traveled at low speeds on deserted country roads;
high-speed collision was hardly an imminent danger. Today, when
automobiles are designed expressly for continual high-speed travel on
crowded superhighways, injury-producing collision at some time in the
lifetime of an automobile is clearly foreseeable. Each day millions of
cars pass within a few feet of each other traveling at high rates of
speed. The realities of modern day driving undercut the notion that
accidents are only foreseeable when there is some structural defect that
causes the collision. Between one-fourth and two-thirds of all new
cars will at some time be involved in an accident producing death
or injury. 58
Today, motor vehicle accidents are a major public problem. In
1966, 53,000 Americans lost their lives in traffic accidents,59 and
another 1,900,000 were injured.6" The economic cost of this mayhem
and slaughter amounted to $10,000,000,000.61 Deaths from motor
vehicle accidents increased by 34% from 1956 to 1966.62 In the State
of Maryland, 1454 people lost their lives in motor vehicle accidents in
the years 1965-1966.63 It seems clear that this grisly toll could be
54' 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
55. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
56. In 1914, for example, there were 71 firms in the industry. G. FITZ & J. RZZSt,
AN ECONOMIc HISTORY Or THX UNIW STATts 341 (2d ed. 1965).
57. Id. at 537-38.
58. O'Connell, Taming of the Automobile, 58 Nw. U. L. Rlv. 299, 348 (1963).
59. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNcIL, ACCIDsNT FACTS 40 (1967 ed.).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 58.
63. Id. at 64.
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substantially reduced by better design practices. For example, the
National Safety Council claims that if all passenger cars were outfitted
with seat belts, and "car occupants used seat belts all the time, 8,000
to 10,000 lives would be saved annually."6 Other single design im-
provements may not be as important; but collectively, a sharp reduc-
tion in automobile accident injuries and fatalities could be realized by
safety-conscious design.
CONCLUSION
The Larsen decision has modernized the concept of duty in auto-
mobile products liability. Larsen accepted the principle that a manu-
facturer has a duty to design and construct a product that is reasonably
fit for its "intended use," but discarded the outdated interpretation of
"intended use."65 In so doing, the court resolved the blatant discrepan-
cies between automobile and non-automobile design cases and made
allowance for changes in technology, economic balance, and environment.
64. Id. at 53. Courts may soon find that car occupants injured in an accident who
were not wearing seat belts were contributorily negligent. See 27 MD. L. Rev. 437
(1967).
65. 391 F.2d at 502-03:
The intended use and purpose of an automobile is to travel on the streets and
highways, which travel more often than not is in close proximity to other vehicles
and at speeds that carry the possibility, probability, and potential of injury-
producing impacts. The realities of the intended and actual use are well known
to the manufacturer and to the public and these realities should be squarely faced
by the manufacturer and the courts.
